Decline in Washington’s hegemony is expected to align with the interests of its competitors, particularly China. Yet, despite the strong appeal, China is unlikely to take advantage of this low-hanging fruit and will continue to be reticent about playing a major security role in the region, according to an analysis published by Observers Research Foundation.
Ahmed Aboudouh the author of the analysis found that “In theory, the new security dynamics in the Gulf can lead to diversification and inclusion—principles that align with China’s policy preferences. Since US President Donald Trump’s return to the White House in 2025, it has become evident that the Gulf States’ efforts to influence the administration’s policy towards de-escalation are undermined by what the author calls ‘Israel’s exceptionalism’ in US Middle East policy that exempts Tel Aviv from complying with the rules of the game.
The rising insecurity in the Gulf states creates incentives to search for alternative security frameworks. This is not a result of strategic intent, as most Gulf countries still prefer to deepen their security partnership with the US.
This was evident in Qatar’s prospective enhanced defence cooperation agreement with Washington, which was announced after Israel’s strike. It was born out of the necessity of pursuing strategic autonomy.
Despite the limited viability of China’s model during a crisis, Beijing does not seem eager to change its track. In fact, one assumes it does not need to.
Two broad factors are predicating China’s caution. First, the Middle East does not feature at the top of China’s strategic priorities compared to its immediate periphery in the South China Sea (SCS) and the first island chain. The 3 September military parade and China’s assertive military posture around disputed territories in the SCS reflect a determination to reshape the world order to serve China’s interests, starting from the East Asian theatre.
The Middle East has long been a significant energy source and has recently served as a source of diplomatic support for China against Taiwan, as well as a testing ground for Beijing’s governance and ideological offerings in the context of strategic competition.
However, the dramatic changes in regional security do not affect China’s security or regime stability directly.
Second, regional security shifts in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) serve China’s interests and undermine the US outlook, as Gulf States’ enhanced agency offers them more options away from exclusive reliance on the US.
The Gulf security order is changing. By the end of the second Trump administration, more external actors, such as Pakistan, may be expected to play a role in a new multipolar regional order. China may be one of them. However, the expectations it may seek to replace the US as the security provider or directly challenge its preponderance will prove to be futile.